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Wben the war stopped, my father and little sister and I went back to
Urakami (suburb of Nagasaki)-although there wasn't much left of it. One
day in October an order from the school was posted: "All pupils of Yamazato Grade School will assemble immediately in the school yard!" I went
right to school. There were three teachers and thirty pupils in the yard.
Twenty..five teachers and about 1200 pupils had died. Another teacher and
about 300 pupils didn't turn up; they were out sick on account of wounds or
atomic sickness. There had been about 60 of us in my class, but only four
turned up. My own teacher was too overcome to speak. He just looked at us
and dismissed us.
-Nagai Takashi, WE OF NAGASAKI, New York, P. 28

The H -bomb appears on the public horizon as a probably attainable
goal. If successful, radioactive poisoning' of the atmosphere, and hence annihilation of any life on earth, has been brought within the range of technical
possibilities.
-Albert Einstein, THE H·BOMB, New York, P. 14

I assume that the people of Russia, very much like the people of the
United States, are anxious to survive, to stay alive, to try to make an end
to warfare. I assume they would rather have the resources of Russia not
turned into tanks, ships, guns and bombs, but into those things attached to
the home which raise the standards of living of the people of Russia.
-Senator Millard E. Tydings, in the Senate, 2/ 6/ 50

The average citizen has more at stake in disarmament than in any other
proposal for domestic or foreign policy. Disarmament will reduce his taxes,
it will reduce international tension and stop the drift toward war, and it may
provide a basis in mutual agreement for the mutual trust and understanding
that are necessary for lasting peace.
Therefore, we should be grateful to any group of citizens that attempts
to study the complex problem of disarmament and we should be glad of their
help as we try to think this problem through for ourselves.
To Chicago's Northside Committee for Peaceful Alternatives, we owe
a debt for doing the spade work that resulted in this Disarmament Guide.
They have done a cool and clear-headed job, with only one bias, a bias for
peace.
Robert J. Havighurst
Chairman of the Executive Board,
Committee for Peaceful Alternatives

PREFACE
One.fifth of our national income now goes for military spending (Chi.
cago Daily News, 3/7/52). For the period from the start of the Korean war
to June 30, 1953, the Administration has received or requested $174,000,000,000 for military purposes, equivalent to $1165 for each man, woman and
child in the U.S. (New York Times, 4/20/52). At this rate, in two more years
we will have reached the amount spent during the whole of World War TI,
330 billion dollars. This while there is peace. Nor have we yet undertaken
the additional cost required to shift our industrial centers in preparation
for an A-bomb war, estimated at 300 billions. (Wm. L. Laurence, The Hell
Bomb, N.Y., P. 79)
Our allies, notably England and France, are at the stage of economic
crisis, as a result of our insistence that they re-ann (AP report, Chicago SunTimes, 6/12/52).
Meanwhile, the more we arm, the more we feel insecure. Describing
the effect of the H-bomb, which they predict the Russians will have as soon
as we will, the Alsops paint the following picture:
The character of this weapon which is in prospect goes beyond what
the normal human imagination can comprehend. The two-megaton
bomb will achieve total destruction in an area of iust under 100
miles. In its single explosion, a whole vast megalopolis, a great mod·
ern capital, can be wiped from the face of the earth.
-Chicago Sun·Times, 6/ 19/ 52

Hand in hand with lowered living standards and the constant dread
of annihilation, our liberties are restricted to meet the demands of the cold
war:
Consider, too, the restriction on freedom already brought about by
the atomic bomb by its pressures upon us to accept loyal.t y checks,
espionage counter measures, and widening areas of official secrecy.
For a preview of the future if the armaments race continues, multi·
ply the effect of these factors by something like 1,000 times-to al.
low for the 1,000 times greater energy release of the hydrogen bomb
-and if you are candid and realistic, I believe you will find it is
difficult indeed to see a dominant role for freedom in such a picture.
-SeJ\ator Brien McMahon, before the Senate, 2/2/50
Little wonder then that viewing this ominous trend, men from all
walks of life have issued grave warnings:
We must try to put an end to the arms race before it puts an end
to us.
-Gov. Adlai Stevenson, Chicago Sun-Times, 6/ 15/ 52
There are two obvious places we could go. One is to war. The other
is broke. There must be another alternative. There must be some
way to learn to live with Russia.
-Henry Ford II, u.s. News and World Report, 1/15/ 52
There is an alternative-it is to end the cold war by settlement of the
issues which inflame it, and to end the arms race by agreement for universal (all nations) and total (all weapons) disarmament.
11his guide will deal mainly with disarmament, but since the impasse
on that question is a reflection of the deadlock on all issues in the cold war,
it will be necessary to deal briefly with the Administration's basic approach
to foreign policy.
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THE UN TACKLES DISARMAMENT

•
• • • • • • • • • • • •• •• •• •• • • • • ••

The UN has been debating disarmament proposals since 1946, when
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Committee for Conventional Arms
were established.
During the summer of 1951, the U.S. and USSR exchanged messages
which expressed agreement in principle:
Whereas the Congress reaffirm its policy I • • • to achieve universal
control of weapons of mass destruction and universal regulation and
reduction of armaments, including armed forces, under adequate
safeguards to protect complying nations against violation and eva·
lion' •••
-Joint resolution of the U.S. Senate and House trans·
mitted by President Truman to the USSR, 7/ 7/ 51

The USSR replied:
It is the duty of all peace-loving nations staunchly to pursue a pol.
icy of preventing war and preserving peace, not to allow an armaments race, to secure a reduction of armaments and the prohibition
of atomic weapons, with control to enforce it •••
Nicholai Shvernik, President of the USSR, 8/ 6/51

Disarmament underwent a full dress debate at the Sixth (paris) Session with each side introducing !=jets of proposals. Overriding the opposition
of the USSR, the Western plan was adopted by the UN; the only part which
found unanimous agreement was the proposal for combining the two disarma
ment committees-atomic energy and conventional arms-into one Disarma·
ment Commission.

REVISED WESTE'RN PLAN (11·19·51)
Sets u.p new Disarmament Commission which is to draft treaties to
be guided ' by the following principles:
a) Objective: "to bring about the limitation and balanced reduction
3

of all armed forces and all armaments to levels adequate for defense but not
for aggression and to achieve effective international control to insure the
prohibition of atomic weapons."
b) "Progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis" of
all arms and armed forces, and "based on effective international inspection"
to insure accuracy. This is to be a "first and indispensable step in carrying
out the disarmament program."
c) Basis for control of atomic weapons shall continue to be the Baruch Plan, which provides for international ownership of atomic facilities
and eliminates the right of veto by the five permanent members of the Security Council on disputes arising from enforcement of the plan.
d) The Disarmament Commission shall begin its work within 30 days
and when part of its program is ready for submission, a conference of all
states shall be convened to consider proposals for a draft treaty.

USSR PLAN (11·16·51)
a) "Unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment
of strict control of the implementation of this prohibition." Implementation ,
by convention to be drafted by Feb. 1, 1952.
b) 11he permanent members of the Securty Council (the Big Five)
reduce arms and armed forces "by one-third during the course of one year."
,c) Within one month all countries shall present "data on the status
of their armaments and armed forces" including atomic weapons and military bases on foreign territory."
d) Set up international control agency within the framework of the
Security Council to control implementation of these decisions.
On Jan. 12, 1952, Mr. Vishinsky submitted to the Political and Security
Committee of the General Assembly, a further proposal that the USSR would
agree to put into effect the prohibition of atomic weapons "at the same time
as the whole system of international control will have been placed into operation," and to continuous, as against periodic, inspection of atomic facilities.

RECENT

~ROPO'SALS

On May 28, 1952, the new Disarmament Commission received from the
U.S., Britain and France, proposals for an "over-all numerical limitation on
all armed forces." The plan suggested a ceiling between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 each for China, the Soviet Union and the U.S., and between 700,000 and
800,000 each for France and Britain. As shown during the course of the debate, this was intended as a counter-proposal to the USSR plan for a onethird cut. The USSR delegate, Mr. Malik, called upon the three Western
powers to detail the nature of the proposed reduction and specifically whether it applied to naval and air personnel as well as ground forces. By his
questions, Mr. Malik indicated that if the Western proposal was tied in with
simultaneous adoption of proposals for "reduction of armaments and the
prohibition of the atomic weapon and all other types of weapons of mass destruction," a basis was offered for fruitfJ11 negotiation.
On Aug. 12, a supplementary proposal was presented by the "three
powers" for a five power conference to seek tentative agreemnt Cln: a) the
distribution by categories of the armed forces within the agreed numerical
4

limitations; b) the types and quantities of arms which they would consider
necessary to support permitted armed forces; and c) the elimination of all
armed forces and armaments other than those expressly permitted, it being
understood that all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction should be
placed under effective international control to ensure its peaceful use only.
(UN Bulletin, 7/1/52 and 8/15/52).

THE PARIS P'RO'POSA'LS···DIFFERENCES
A profound distrust of motive breathes through the speeches of both
sides. President Truman's address of Nov. 7, 1951, clearly sug~~ts that he is
preoccupied with fear of Communist aggression; and Mr. Vi$hinsky indicates
equal suspicion that America will use its atomic superiority to launch an attack from its air bases around the USSR.
Certain of the differences between the proposals stem from the inherent complexity of the pro·blem. It is hard to tailor proposals to fit both
atomic and conventional arms. And within one area-atomic disarmamentthere are difficult choices to make. Chester I. Barnard, President of the
Rockefeller Foundation, who helped draft the Baruch plan, summed them
up as follows:
1. Shall an international authority take ownership of the raw
materials (uranium and thorium) and operate aU potentially dangerous projects in atomic energy, or shall each nation develop its own
atomic energy program, with in.t ernational inspectors to see that it
does not make atomic weapons?
2. Shall atomic disarmament proceed in a series of stages, or
shall atomic bombs be outlawed and existing stockpiles be d!'stroyed
by immediate agreement?
3.
Shall charges and penalties against a nation accused of violating the control. agreement ultimately be decided by a maiority
or by a unanimous vote of the UN Security Council?
-Scientific American, Nov. 1949

These questions merit closer analysis.
Question. 1. The U.S. for six years, since its introduction into the UN,
has adhered to the Baruch plan (sometimes called the UN Majority Plan),
which calls for international ownership and management of atomic facilities.
The USSR, instead, has proposed national ownership with a system of inspection by an international control agency under the UN. On October 23, 1950,
Mr. Vishinsky described his view of the inspection process and proposed:
that the international control agency shall be entitled to:
a) Have access to all enterprises for extracting, production and
stockpiling of atomic raw materials as well as exploration of atomic
energy,
b) The right of observation in atomic energy enterprises with
production operations to the extent necessary for control over util~
zation. of atomic materials and energy,
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c) The right to carry out measures concerning weighing, verification, and analysis of various kinds of atomic raw materials.
d) The right to demand from the government of any state and
to verify all kinds of information on activities of atomic energy enterprises.

This inspection system is to be directed, according to the USSR, by
an international control agency acting by a simple majority (no veto power).
The U.S., on the other hand, has taken the position, as stated just recently
by Secretary Acheson, 1/ 16/52:
It is perfectly clear that no system of inspection alone, be it periodic
or continuous, can ensure the effective prohibition of atomic weap·
ons. A system of control based upon these safeguards (the Baruch
plan) is the only one so far devised that can be both workable and
effectiv·e. We are prepared to examine any other proposals that
might be equally or more workable or effective.
-Dept. of State Release No. 39
Question 2. The U.S. has favored the establishment of a system of
control by stages; the final stage, when approved by U.S. con's titutional
processes, is to be the conversion of the stockpile of A-bombs to civiliap
use. As a "first and indispensable" stage all arms, atomic and conventional,
shall be disclosed and verified starting with the least sensitive and continuing until atomic weapons are disclosed. The U.S. has also stated that a prior
condition for disarmament is the settlement of the Korean conflict and other
political issues. (Sec'y of State Acheson, Speech to UN, 11/8/ 51)
The USSR favors the simultaneous prohibition, and adoption of a control system over such prohibition, of atomic weapons. In criticism of the Baruch plan of "stages" it has pointed out that there was no binding commitment to carry out the last stage for which all the others are preparations.
It has further opposed the "stages" idea on the grounds that it would result
in the indefinite postponement of information on the most destructive and
dangerous arms. Instead it proposes that each country submit data on its
arms and armed forces to the UN within one month of adoption of such a
resolution, and that verification be conducted afterward by the UN control
agency. The USSR has called, also, for a 1-3 cut in all arms.
The U.S. has opposed prohibition of the atomic weapon on the ground
that until a system of control is in operation, prohibition would be "unenforceable and illusory." It has opposed the 1-3 cut idea because it would
preserve the present "imbalance" between it and the USSR. The U.S. proposes "balanced reduction" to levels "adequate for defense but not for aggression" and states that the measure of necessary balance can be determined
only on the basis of verified information as to the existing state of arma·
ments.
Question 3. The Baruch plan provides for the elimination of the veto
power by members of the Security Council on matters of violation (and punishment) of decisions of the international control agency on the ground that
if a nation violating the disarmament treaty can veto punishment, then the
control system is useless. The USSR, on the other hand, has insisted upon
maintaining the unanimity principle written into the UN Charter and has
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opposed elimination of the veto power because it fears that the U.S. will use
its majority support in the UN against the interests of the USSR.

TABLE OF D'IFFERENCES
u.s.

USSR

ATOMIC ENERGY

ownership and
operation

by int'l agency w h i c h
will own and manage
atomic facilities

national ownership pI u s
system of continuous inspection by int'l agency

enforcement of
plan-the veto

by sanctions imposed by
the UN - elimination of
veto power

no veto on day to day
operations of agency but
veto on sanctions

in stages, starting with
disclosure and verification as "first and indispensable step"; no disarmament until Korean
and other conflicts are
settled.
Conference of all states
to consider treaty when
Disarmament Commission
is ready with draft.

immediate ado p t ion of
p I a n to simultaneously
prohibit atomic weapons
and establish control system for enforcement. All
other weapons and armed
forces 1-3 cut within one
year subject to verification based on census to
be submitted in 0 n e
month.

All ARMS IN·
ClUDING ATOMIC

timing

•
•
••

PROGRESS TOWARD AGREEMENT
••

• • • • • • ••• •• ••• • ••• • • • •• • •

So far we have considered only barriers to disarmament. Are there
reasons to think it can be accomplished? Yes!-and one of the best is provided by the big powers themselves; they are actually moving closer to
agreement. At the beginning of the whole controversy, East and West were
7

farther apart. But by this time, we can record a number of concessions by
each side:
In proposing a census of arms the U.S. has agreed to inclusion of
atomic arms whereas formerly it opposed its inclusion before. con·
trol system had been. agreed to.
Whereas previously the U.S. separated atomic control from convene
tional arms, it has now agreed to approach disarmament as a uni·
fied problem The result has been that the Paris UN session com·
bined the two commissions into one Disarmament Commission which
now is meeting in New York. The USSR has conceded, first, that
prohibition of the atom bomb shall become effective simultaneous
with the establishment of control machinery, whereas it had previously argued for prohibition first; and, second, it has agreed to
CONTINUOUS inspection of atomic facHities by the international
control agency rather than PERIODIC.

And another good reason to hope that disarmament will be accomplished is this: the deadlock over the main issues can be broken if we will
act to do so. There are effective alternatives to our present policies which
offer a basis for successful negotiation.
But before these alternatives can have a fair chance of proper consideration, it is necessary that two things happen:
1. We must abandon the notion that we can secure peace by strength
alone; that we can force agreement by a preponderance of arms without having to wage war. If our UN representatives are motivated by such a policy,
then it is likely they will not be constrained to seek a compromise solution
to the disarmament controversy; rather they will tend to wait until such time
as we accumulate preponderant force and then "lay down the law" to the
USSR.

2. We need to realize that an international disarmament agreement,
in the nature of the thing, cannot provide absolute safeguards against violation but only relative ones. Clearly, if our UN representatives refuse to
compromise for something less than what we conceive to be absolute safeguards, then no agreement at all is possible. Point two is related to point
one-if our idea of an agreement is not accepted then we will compel it by
the preponderance of arms we expect to have sometime in the future.

8
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PEACE BY STRENGTH CAN LEAD TO WAR

••••••••••••••••••••••••••

How do our European friends view our foreign policy which a State
Department bulletin summarized as follows:
Helping to create situations of strength in many parts of the world
is the Number 1 policy of the United States in the year 1950. This
pol.icy holds out the best hope of reaching eventual agreement with
the Soviet Union.
-OUR FOREIGN POLICY, Dept. of State Publication, Sept. 1950

In August, 1951, Kent Cooper, head of the Associated Press,
returned from Europe with the report that "Europe is afraid to
death of our defense program-afraid it might turn into a aggressive policy." Ernest T. Weir, chairman of the National Steel Corporation, upon his return from a trip abroad said:
It is a widely held opinion in Europe that the present conduct of
the United States will result in war, which helps to explain why we
receive only half-hearted support from nations which are our natural
aUies.
-Statement on our Foreign Situation, Pittsburgh, 1/5/ 51

Reporting from Europe, J. Alvarez DelVayo, foreign correspondent
for The Nation, expressed the feelings of European leaders as follows:
The Americans try to reassure us by saying that the task of creating
positions of strength has caused difficulty which will disappear as
the armaments program approaches completion. But what guaranty
have we that the United States will consider it necessary or advantageous to negotiate with the Russians? May not the desire to deliver an ultimatum overrule its al.lies' demand for a negotiated settlement? That question haunts us and overshadows every other cal·
culation.
-The Nation, 2/ 9/ 52

This concern is clearer perhaps, when the logical development of an
9

arms race is considered. Lord Edward Grey, a leading English political figure
of World War I, summed up the lessons of that holocaust in the following
words:
The moral is obvious; it is that great armaments lead inevitably to
war. If there are armaments on one side, there must be armaments
on both sides_ •• _
The enormous growth of armaments in. Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them-it was these that made war inevitable. This, it seems to me, is the truest reading of history and the
lesson that the present should be learning from the past in the interest of future peace, the warning to be handed on to those who
come after us.
-Twenty-five Years, 1925, Vol. 1, pps. 91-2

Secretary of State Acheson in apparent contradiction with his own
policy "that war will not happen if we can create in areas of political tension
sufficient strength," is compelled to recognize the danger of an outbreak:
What are we worried about? What we are worried about is that
large and powerful countries and their associates may so increase
their armaments and armed forces that other countries will believe
that aggression is threatened and then they increase their arms and
armed forces and, in turn, there is another increase. So, there is
this rise in armed forces and armaments of the various countries
and an increase-a dangerous increase in tension.
-Sec'y of State Acheson, Speech to UN, 11/20/51

Yet President Truman in a remarka'ble White House press conference on Sept. 20, 1951, gave official sanction to the policy of force when
he declared that his aim was to create sufficient military strength not only
to force the Soviet Union and its satellites to keep the peace, but to compel
these countries to honor their treaty agreements.
According to the New York Times, its repocter then asked the President whether it would be correct to infer that the U.S. would in future rely
upon force, rather than diplomacy, in dealing with the Soviet Union. Mr. Tru·
man replied that, in the existing circumfstances, this was necessarily true,
adding that he disliked it very much but no longer had any choice in the
matter.
James P. Wal"burg, one of our foremost writers on foreign policy, commenting upon this press conference, said:
.
Anyone who read this account must have realized, if he had not
realized it before, that American. diplomacy had, for the time being
at least, dedared its complete bankruptcy-that Mr. Truman had,
in effect, announced a total suspension of diplomacy until rearmament might provide him with sufficient power NOT TO NEGOTI·
ATE but to enforce agreements. In other words, the President was
saying that, when we had sufficient force-meaning preponderant
force-we would not seek compromise but lay down the law. To say
that we would not make agreements until we had the power to en·
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force them could scarcely mean anything other than l I until we have
the power to dictate what the agreements shall be."
-How to Co-exlst Without Playing
the Kremlin's Game, Boston, 1952, p. 206

How wide is the gap between the policy voiced by the President and
a direct advocacy of preventive war? What does the President propose to do
if the Soviet Union does not submit? The President supplies no answer but
already others have carried this type of thinking to its logical conclusion by
suggesting that
Possibly we ought to destroy the Stalin government while we can.
It could be done within forty-eight hours with terrifying results •••
We can polish off the Stalin regime. Have we the stomach for it?
We have the means.
-Chicago Tribune, editorial, 6/13/47

If it is argued that this insanity has nothing in common with the
thinking of our national leadership, then how account for a Secretary of
the Navy, Francis P. Matthews, publicly espousing a war of aggression which
he claimed would
cast us in a character new to a true democracy-an initiator of a
war of aggression-it would win for us a proud title-we would
become the first aggressors for peace.
-New York Times, 8/26/50

Not less warlike, is the point of view of John Foster Dulles who wrote
the GOP foregin policy plank and who, next to Acheson, is prqbably the
most influential of our diplomats. In a Sun..Times interview after the Republican Convention, he was asked:
"What do you think the principal foreign policy differences between
Republicans and Democrats wHI be in the campaign?"
Dulles replied:
"Liberation versus 'containment' will be the No. 1 issue on whfch
the two parties are most sharply in conflict and on. which the positive and dynamic approach of the Republican Party will come into
headlong collision with the negative, defensive policy of con.t aining
communism-the pol,icy being pursued by the Truman admnistra.
tion •• •"
-Sun-Times, 7/12/52

In the statements quoted above we have seen enunciated a range of
policy which includes "situations of strength to deter an aggressor," "containment," "liberation," and "preventive war." To the keepers of our armed
forces all four may be possible alternatives because all are simply degrees
of one policy, namely, the use of force to compel agreement.
If, as Mr. Warburg claims, U.S. policy in the UN disarmament talks
is one of forcing agreements on our own terms, clearly it would be impossible to secure fair consideration of alternatives for achieving a compromise
11

settlement. In fact, the U.S. representatives are laid open to the charge that
their function is to stall (the very charge we lay against the Russians) until
the time we have built a preponderant force.
The foregoing discussion leads to the following conclusion: The policy
of "peace by strength" is a policy of imposing peace by force which in the
context of the present circumstances when two world powers are in opposing camps and it is inconceivable that either will bow to the other, is a policy which inevitably will bring war-atom bomb war. An imposed peace,
comes after war; it is imposed ·by the victor over the vanquished. But a
peace pact, a disarmament treaty as part of a peace pact, is based upon the
unwillingness to go to war, on the common desire to avoid the awful consequences of war. It is not imposed; it is negotiated, and its earmark is compromise, not ultimatum.

•
•
••

THE MYTH OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT
•

• •• • • • • • • • • • ••••••••• •• ••

Insofar as the American people have supported, at great cost, a much
expanded military establishment, they have done so in the belief that this
was necessary to catch up with the USSR, which after World War n had not
disarmed, whereas we had. A Quaker committee, which made a thoughtful
study of our foreign policy, asserts that this does not square with the facts:
Another inaccuracy widely believed is that the United States disarmed unilaterally after World War II, thereby weakening itself and
opening the way for Soviet expansion. The fallacy in this is in its
frame of reference, for while it is true that we demobilized our
army to a much larger extent than did the Russians, the miUtary
strength of the United States has never been measured by the size
of its standing army. For geographic reasons we rely primarily on
sea and air power, while the Soviet Union is primarily a land power. If all categories of weapons are included, as they must be in any
fair analysis of military strength, the theory of America's unilateral
disarmament collapses. In the years since the war, our production
of atomic weapons has proceeded at an increasing tempo, accom·
panied by the maintenance of a far.flung network of air bases and
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the bombing pl.a nes necessary for their delivery. Our navy, by far
the largest in the world, has been maintained on a standby basis.
In no post.war year has our military budget fallen below eleven billion dollars. This is hardly unilateral. disarmament.
-Steps to Peace, A Quaker View of U.S.

Foreign Policy, 1951, pps. 48-9

•
•
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WHAT CAN ADISARMAMENT TREATY DO?

•
•••••••••••••••••••••••••

During the de~bate on bacterial warfare at the UN Disarmament Com·
mission meetings of May 22 and 28, Benjamin V. Cohen explained the U.S.
failure to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning gas and bacterial warfare, on the grounds that the "paper pledge of some states were valueless."
He went on to say that:
The important problem was not a 27 year old Protocol which had
become obsolete, however, but what nations were willing to do to
bring about a foolproof system of arms reduction that would include
the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.
-UN Bulletin, 6/ 15/ 52 p. 491

Yet the Geneva Protocol has been kept for 27 yaers marked by innumerable wars including World War II. This "paper pledge" appears to have
contained excellent safeguards since it has met the only real test-history.
Why has it been kept? Because, when humanity universally rejects a
method of warfare too horrible to be permitted, even the most warlike government, including the Hitler government, must refrain from using it. It
does so, not alone because of universal condemnation, but because it knows
that retaliation would follow. If this has held true for gas and bacterial warfare, would it not apply with more strength to atom and H-bombs?
The guaranty of an international agreement renouncing a particular
method of warfare lies in the mutual interest of the people of the nations
party to it to see that it is enforced.

A simple renunciation, or a pledge not to be the first to use a particular weapon, therefore, has great weight and importance. Frederick L. Schu13

man, Professor of International Law at Williams College, addressing the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 9, 1950, supported an agreement of
this kind as a step in the right direction:
Americans have been conditioned by their leaders to regard any
arrangement oHering less than one hundred percent security as
worse than no arrangement at all ••• No complete security can ever
be had. An atomic arms race, coupled with a treaty not to use
atomic weapons, save in retaliation, promises a degree of security
which, though small, is yet above zero.
Such a very modest step as this taken without iIIusions-could con·
ceivably contribute toward further steps, toward a slow diminution
of fear and hate on both sides, and-who can now know?-possibly
toward the emergence of series of settlements foreshadowing a real
peace and an eventual world order to keep the peace.
-Atomic DiplomacYi Deadlock and Prospects, pps. 11-13

Other voices have spoken in favor of our government taking this step.
Stating that the H-bomb "is no longer a weapon of war but a means of extermination of whole populations," a group of 12 physicists at Columbia University, several of them prominent in the development of the A-bomb, while
asking that we exert ourselves to secure an agreement to eliminate weapons
of mass destruction from the arsenals of nations, called upon the U.S. to
meanwhile "make a solemn declaration that we shall never use this bomb
first." (The H-Bomb, p. 127) Citing the fact that "the belligerents during the
second World War respected the Convention against the use of l>oison gas
or bacterial weapons according to the Protocol of June, 1925," the International Committee of the Red Cross, on April 5, 1950, addressed an appeal
to the governments of 62 countries asking them to "set to work to reach an
agreement on the banning of atom weapons ..."
How fearful the peoples of the world are of a sudden A-bomb war
is attested to by many observers. Ernest T. Weir, in the speech cited earlier, said in conclusion:
People in Europe are definitely opposed to use of the atomic bomb.
In fact, I was quite surprised at the unanimity of this opinion. They
believe that if the atomic bomb should be used, there would never
again be any feeling of security left in the world. The President's
statement a short while ago that the United States was considering
the use of the atomic bomb was, in itself, a bombshel.1 in Europe
and really frightening in its effect.

John Foster Dulles, in a major foreign policy speech delivered to the
National Conference of Christians and Jews in Ne'w York on May 12, 1952,
frankly stated:
The hard truth is, as my recent visits in both the East and West
have made clear to me, that many of the peoples of the world have
less fear of the Red Army than fear that the United itates may
rashly precipitate atomic warfare against which their population
centers are utterly defenseless.
-Christian Science Monitor, 5/14/52
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A simple pledge not to be the first to use the A-bomb or bacterial
warfare, solemnly taken by the nations before the UN Assembly, and embodied in a written agreement published to all the peoples of the world,
would do much to allay fear and suspicion and open the way for more elaborate agreements.
A disarmament agreement, however, is more than a simple pledge. It
can stop the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, reduce and limit
other arms and armed forces, and it can provide safeguards against violation
by a system of control over such prohibition, reduction and limitation. But
these safeguards, in the very nature of things cannot provide absolute security because sovereign nations, unlike the citizens of a particular country,
are not bound by laws and courts of competent jurisdiction, and it appears
that we will have to live with this situation for some time to come.
Nevertheless, certain safeguards are possible which offer security of
considerable value, namely, a system of inspection and warning of possible
violation. The system must be so devised as to catch the intention to violate
quickly and to issue timely warning so that the offended nations may promptly take steps to protect themselves. Essentially the consequences of violation
are similar to those described for violation of the Geneva Protocol, namely,
universal condemnation, retaliation, and the adverse reaction of the violating
nation's people.
The key importance of warning of possible violation was stressed ' in
a statement of the Federation of American Scientists calling upon President
Truman to establish a new committee to review our atomic energy policy
with a view to "breaking the present stubborn deadlock":
Our obiective must con.t in·u e to be effective atomic control, including thorough-going inspection. But we must consider al.t ernative proposals; perhaps proposals without the far-reaching international
ownership concept, perhaps proposals making greater concession to
national interests, certainly proposals in which procedural issues
are subordinate to the simple question of adequacy in giving na.
tions warning of possible violation.
-New York Times, 2/ 6/50

To summarize the two preceding sections: With a change in policy
from reliance on armed force, to reliance upon diplomacy and negotiations
to secure agreements and, with acceptance of the premise that a disarmament
treaty offers relative but not absolute security against violation, the present
dangerous impasse in the disarmament controversy will yield to compromise
solutions, the nature of which is discussed in the next sections of this Guide.

lS

•

•

6•
•

THE BARUCH PLAN IS DATED

•
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••

Since 1946, the U.S. has adhered to the Baruch plan for disarmament
and A-bomb control. While we have stated our willingness to consider other
plans, we have not accepted any changes, and we are still pressing for its
two basic concepts, viz., international ownership of atomic power facilities
and the abrogation of the veto power of UN Security Council members on
violations and punishment. These two conditions are made mandatory in the
plan before we will take the first steps to disarm.
In presenting the plan, on June 14, 1946, before the UN Atomic Energy Commission, Bernard Baruch said:
But before a country is ready to relinquish any winning
it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have
tee of safety, not only against the offenders in the atomic
against the illegal users of other weapons-bacteriological,
gas-perhaps-why not? against war itself?*

weapons,
a guaran..
area, but
biological

Of course we now know what Baruch at the time did not, that the
U.S. would not maintain a monopoly of "winning weapons," and that the
USSR would have the A-bomb three years later. While many scientists and
political commentators have recognized that this has completely changed the
picture, our disarmament policies are still based on Baruch's premises.
Hanson Baldwin, military writer for the New York Times, is among
the many who have called our proposals dated:
We have done nothing to modernize our concepts of atomic energy
control. The world has been haggling these past years about the
international control of atomic energy and all its discussions have
-The implication which has been drawn from this state'm ent is that even had the Rus·
sians accepted the Baruch plan, the U.S. did not contemplate relinquishing its atom
bombs until it had guarantees against other forms of mass de's truction. The Russians
charged in the UN debates that the U.S. would always find a good reason for postponing the conversion of the bombs on the grounds that either the guarantees were
insufficient or that a particular weapon had not yet been controlled.
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been based upon' data that is now dated: 1) United States monopoly
of the bomb; ••• Some new thinking is in order •••
-New York Times, 12/ 2/ 49

Walter Lippmann in his nationally syndicated column, argued that the
Baruch plan was based on a complete fallacy and we cannot in good conscience stand before the world unless we change our proposals to fit the
new situation:
••• the Baruch plan', as well as the report of the Acheson-Lilienthal
board which preceded it, was a miscalculation based on misinforma~
tion about the progress of Russia in the field of atomic energy. The
American plan of 1946-1947 rested on what we now know to have
been' a complete faUacy-namely that the United States had a monopoly of the technical processes and means of producing nuclear
fuels.
All the terms and conditions attached to the Baruch offer assumed
that we had such a monopoly, and that if the Russians did not ac..
cept the terms and conditions, we would retain the monopoly of the
bomb for many years to come and that the Russians would not have
the bomb for many years to come.
The Russians achieved the bomb within two years of Baruch's proposal.
15 it not self-evident that if we wish to make proposals for atomic
peace, while we are involved unavoidably in a race of atomic armaments, then the Acheson-Lilienthal board, or something like it, must
be I"econvened-and the whole problem re-examined in the light of
what we know now that we did not know then?
It really is not good enough for us to stand before the world and
our own consciences on a plan and a policy which are manifestly
and demonstrably obsoloete and impracticable.
No offer of money, no protestations of our good faith, no beating
of our breasts about the horrors of the heU-bomb, will be a substitute for a deep effort of mind to think out fresh proposals based
on the actual fact that now there are two atomic powers in the
world, and ftO longer on'ly one. If we persist in saying that the old
plan is still our plan, we shall lay ourselves wide open to the charge,
not only from the Russians but from our friends aU over the world,
that we are not seriously interested in any plan.
-Chicago Sun-rimes, 2/ 6/ 50

David E. Lilienthal, one of the Baruch plan's principal authors, declared in a television interview that his own brain child "couldn't possibly
be accepted now, and we shouldn't leave it outstanding." (quoted by G€orge
W. Herald, UN World, Dec. 1951)
Evidently taking recognition of the mounting demands for a review
of the Baruch plan proposals, the Department of State on April 28, 1952,
announced the "formation of a panel of consultants to advise and assist the
Department of State .. . in connection with the work of the United Nations
Disarmament Commission." Listed as the consultants are Vannevar Bush, J.
Robert Oppenheimer, Allen W. Dulles, Joseph E. Johnson and John Dickey.
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Commenting upon this action, the Alsops, in their column, said:
The" stated purpose of the new committee is to prepare fresh American proposals for disarmament and atomic energy control" ••• the
State Department policy makers rather plainly indicated that they
did not hope for important results but thought a try had to be made
for the look of things abroad.
-Chicago Sun-Times, 5/22/ 52

The question is: will we have new proposals coming from this committee, or will we have a new look to the old proposals?

INTE'R NATIONAL OWNERSHIP vs. IN'SPECTION
The concept of international ownership of atomic facilities requires a
voluntary surrender of national sovereignty which never has been seen in
modern history. It could have been contemplated by the authors of the Baruch plan only because they erroneously considered that the u.s. was in possession of such an awe-inspiring weapon that even the most powerful nations
would have to yield in the face of it. But not all the drafters of the plan
were of one mind. Mr. Barnard, for one, expressed his misgivings:
In 1946 the State Department board of which David E. Lilienthal
was chairman and I was a member, arrived quickly at agreement
on a general plan for the intern'a tional control of atomic energy.
Yet it seemed to me at the time that logical and sound as the plan
was, the chances of its adoption were very small .•• It appeared
likely that every country, includin'9 our own, would encounter extreme technical and popular difficulties in renouncing that consid·
erable portion of its national sovereignty which acceptance of the
contemplated pact would require.
-Scientific American, Nov. 1949

Does a system of inspection offer an adequate alternative? Scientists
who have worked on the atom bomb seem to think so. George W. Herald in
an article entitled, "How to Stop the A-bomb Race," states that engineers
and atomic scientists consider that adequate means of inspection can be
worked out and quotes from a statement of the Geological Society of America and the American Institute of Mining and Metal Engineers, which in part
said:
200 inspectors with appropriate qualifications stationed at known
world centers of uranium production and several hundred experts
in total would be able to develop and successfully apply an international inspection system of nuclear raw materials.
-UN World, Dec. 1951

Joining in this position is the Federation of American Scientists
whose statement quoted earl~er called for abandonment of the international
ownership concept in favor of a system of inspection geared to giving warning of possible violation.
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The Chicago Sun-Times expressed the OpInIOn that nothing in the Soviet state structure would militate against adequate inspection:
••• the fuU record of Soviet policy since 1917 suggests that there
is nothing INHERENT in the ideology or. structure of the Soviet
state which makes impossible a disarmament pact that could be
checked and supervised by effective international inspection'.
- Chicago Sun-Times, editorial, 2/ 27/ 50

Will the Russ~ans be amenable to negotiating a system of rigorous
inspection? Will they surrender the limited part of national sovereignty
which an inspect:.'on system makes necessary?
•.. The Soviet Union has repeatedly pointed out that it is an absolute natural necessity in certain cases to I,imit to some exten,t , or
in some part, state sovereignty on the basis of reciprocity and in
the interests of international cooperation ••• The matter at issue
is the degree, the extent, the type of limitations .••
- Andrei Vishinsky, before Special Political

Committee of the UN. 11/10/49
Conclusion: Certainly the U.S. should explore in negotiations with the
Soviet Union the possibility of establishing an adequate system of inspection on some basis short of international ownership.

THE VETO
The American public has been conditioned to view antagonisti'cally
the exercise of the veto by the USSR and so its opposition to the Baruch
proposal IS viewed with hostility. Yet the historical facts prove conclusively
that the veto power by the permanent members of the Security Council (U.S.,
USSR, Britain, France and China) was written into the UN Charter upon the
express insistence of the U.S. as well as the USSR.
The explanation for our position was given by Secretary of State
George Marshall (May, 1948) to the House Foreign Relations Committee,
when he said: "We do not want to have our manpower and our strength
committed by a two-thirds vote." Marshall went on to decry current attempts
for "the elimination of the veto on enforcement measures."
The eHmination of the veto, which Bernard Baruch thought would
make for "international law with teeth in it," does not guarantee against
violation. This was pointed out by Mr. Baruch's collaborator, Chester I. Barnard:
Mr. Lillienthal and I personally begged Mr. Baruch not to introduce
the veto problem •.. when a nation is found violating an agreement of this kind, war has already started. There is no use fool.ing
with the thing any more, and the debate on veto questions is irrelevant.
-Dartmouth Alumni Magazine, Feb., 1948

Certainly in the face of an American majority in the UN, the surren19

der of the veto could not be expected to be acceptable to thE: USSR. John
Foster Dulles bluntly stated that the u.S. may some day require the veto
power should the situation reverse itself:
It has happened so far that a majority in the Security Council has
been friendly to the Un'ited States, so that our veto has not been
needed to protect our interests. But it may not always be so; and, if
it should not be so, certainly the United States would want to have a
veto power.

Dulles then went on to hit at the very nub of the question:
The veto is not merely a check on what could be arbitrary despot·
ism. It also reflects, rather crudely, a basic reality. At the present
stage of world development, the United Nations cannot be used to
coerce any great power. Great powers may be subiect to moral
pressure; and, as we have seen, they are ..• If the United Nations
is to reflect the reality of world affairs, one reality is that great
powers cannot be coerced except through defeat in war.
-War or Peace, New York, 1950, pps. 195-6

The UN was established as a continuation of the "Grand Alliance"
which won the war against the Fascist Axis. Its foundation is the unity of
the five major powers, and a successful attelllDt to align for war, any combination of powers against one or more of the five, would mean the end of
the UN as conceived by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. The idea of "collective securlty," a concept which arose during the pre-World War IT period,
as a method of combating the Axis powers, cannot be revived through the
UN. Frederick L. Schuman addressed himself to this question as follows:
Third, we must come to recognize anew that collective security as
a means of keeping the peace is an iUusion, that the United Nations
organization was never designed or intended to be an agency of
collective security save on the basis of a con'c ert of all the Great
Powers, and that if we would preserve the United Nations as a pos·
sible basis for future world government, we must think of it and
deal with it not as a police force to wage war, which it is not and
can never be, but as a form of discussion and an arena of diplomacy
for the keeping of the peace.
-Peace Without Appeasement, an address delivered before the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 3/ 15/51

The same idea was differently stated by the Commission on World
Peace of the Methodist Church at its meeting at Evanston, Ill., November
11-13, 1951:
In the move toward disarmament and world order, the United Nations is our best hope. If it is to serve, it must not become the instrument of any bloc of nations girding those nations for world-wide
war. If it is to serve, it must be maintained for all nations, regard-
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less of difficulties that may be encountered in arriving at agreement or in securing unan.imity_
-From the resolution, IIChallenge to Peacemaking"

The prevention of a third world war, for which the UN was created,
is based upon the principle of unanimity of the Great Powers. The restoration of that principle to the full power It enjoyed at the inception of the
UN is absolutely essential if progress it to be made in strengthening it; in
fact, If it is to survive at all for the accomplishment of its objective. From
time to time leading spokesmen in the UN have recognized the need for
restoration of the unity of the major powers. At the Paris session of the
UN, the President of France, Vincent Auri'ol, in his opening remarks called
for private talks among the Big Four to try ot reach agreement on disarmament plans. Sir Benegal Rau of India joined in the suggestion:
India called for another round of Big Four negotiations and urged
the major powers to sign a ioint no-war declaration.
-New York Times, 11/15/51

Conclusion: Pressure to eliminate the veto power, knowing beforehand
that this can only drive the USSR and Its supporters from the UN and in
effect destroy the UN as a peacemaking body, is part of the policy of reliance on force and should be abandoned in favor of a policy of agreement
through ngeotiation.

•
•
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•
•

PACKAGE vs. PIECEMEAL APPROACH

•
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••

Throughout the disarmament debate the U.S. has put controls first
whereas the USSR has put prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and
disarmament first. The UN Disarmament Commission which 1S now meeting
in New York, has been deadlocked over this very issue with the U.S. insisting upon a census (disclosure and verification) of all arms as the first step
to establlshing a control system, and the USSR opposing this proposal on
the grounds that it would interminably delay prohibition and disarmament.
While extensive debates are raging over these questions they may
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well prove to be mInor in importance and will yield to solution once the
two major issues, ownership of atomic energy and the veto, are resolved.
The acrimony of the debate is a reflection of the deadlock on the key issues.
Solution will probably come through a package rather than a piecemeal approach. Neither controls nor prohlhition will come first, but rather
a completely negotiated disarmament agreement will more likely be the
outcome. Such an agreement, or treaty, will contain clauses on the principled questions, such as prohibition, as well as the details of execution and
their order in point of time. It will also contain clauses on the control and
inspection system.
Evidently the government of India had something like this in mind
as instructions for the guidance of its UN delegate Sir Benegal Rau, to be
introduced should a propitious occasion offer itself during the ParIs sessions. Robert Trumbull of the New York Times reported from New Delhi on
the main ideas of the IndIan plan:
In view of the dependence of each group on the supposed superi.
ority in one classification of armament-the U.S. and its allies in
atomic weapons and the USSR in manpower and conventional types
-India believes some rel,a tion.s hip must be established between' reo
duction and limitation of both types of weapons. The proposal there·
fore is made that a louncil be set up to determine the principles
to govern disarmament. Upon acceptance of these by both sides the
council would split in two wings.
(a) one to implement the principles
(b) the other to conduct inspection and census of existing areas.
At no stage would either side have cause to fear an over balance
of strength in favor of the other. This would be accompanied by applying the principle of coordin'a tion in the fol,lowing way:
1. While the U.S. is reducing the atomic arsenal, there must be
simultaneous reduction in the Soviet's favorable ration of conven·
tional weapons.
2. In order to effect a workable compromise between the two plans,
concessions will have to be made to the demands of each.
-New York Times, 11/23/51. Quoted in World Dis·
armament Plans, publication of the Women's In-

ternational League for Peace and Freedom.
The Soviet Union's concession to the principle of simultaneity with
respect to prohibition and control has paved the way for a package agreement.
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CAN WE TRUST THE RUSSIANS?
•

• ••••••••••••••••••••••••

Suppose we answered this question with a "No" and then added that
neither do the Russians trust us? Just where does this get us?
There is no proposal that we disarm unilaterally and then trust the
Russians or anyone else not to take advantage of us. The proposal is for
disarmament by agreement on a basis which sets up safeguards against violation.
It would be wIse for us to recognize that international diplomacy is
not based upon trust at all but on national sel,f ·interest,* and this suggests
to us that we seek to avoid atomic war. It happens to conform to the national
self-interest of the USSR, and of all nations. Basically it is this coincidence
of interest which makes agreement possl!ble. A statement of the Illinois Committee for Peaceful Alternatives puts the case succinctly:
There can be no victor in an atomic war. No difference between
nations can be so great that mutual, ann'ihilation is the only answer.
The peaceful co-existence of nations having divergent social and
economic systems is not only possible but imperative.
-Policy for Peace

And these words are echoed by a famous atomic scientist:
When Dr. Oppenheimer, who supervised the creation of the first
atomic bomb, appeared before a Congressional Committee, he was
asked if there was any defense against the weapon'. "Certainly/I the
great physicist replied confidently. "And that is •••?" Dr. Oppen.
heimer looked over the hushed expectant audience, then whispered
into the microphone, "Peace"!
-Readerls Digest, Oct., 1951, p. 100
·"Trust" may be built up between nations as a result of common interests operating
over a period of time, but even in dealings with "trusted nations," diplomats seek to
drive the best bargain for the nation they represent.

••
•

CONCLUSIONS
•

•••••••••••••••••••••••••

In summary we list the principal conclusions reached in this Guide:
1. That we are engaged in an accelerating arms race which, if unchecked, will inevitably lead to atomic war.

2. That in order to relieve the tension and provide a better atmosphere for negotiations, the U.S. pledge that it will not be first to use atomic
or bacterial weapons if the USSR will make a similar pledge.
3. That in order to break the six-year deadlock in disarmament negotiations, it is Incumbent on our side to explore alternatives to our present
proposals; that before these alternatives can receive proper consideration we
must change our policy of reliance on force and situations of strength, to
reliance upon diplomacy and negotiation; and that we should recognize that
a disarmament agreement while giving us a measure of security cannot by
its nature offer absolute guarantees against violation.
4. That we recognize that the basis for success in negotiatIon is the
mutuality of interest of the U.S., the USSR, and of all nations, in avoiding
an atom bomb war.
5. That the Baruch proposals are outmoded; that the concept of international ownership should be replaced with proposals for an adequate
system of inspection and warning of possible violation.: that the J)rol)osal for
eliminatiOn of the veto power should be relinquished and be replaced with
measures for strengthening the cooperation of the major powers with a view
to restoring the peace-making functions of the UN.

SUGGE'STIONS FOR FURTHER READING:
World Disarmament Plans, The Committee for World Disarmament

and World Reconstruction, Women's InternatlOnal League for Peace
& Freedom, 2006 Walnut St., Philadelphia 3, Pa.
Toward Security Through Disarmament, American Friends Service

Committee, 20 S. 12th St., PhiladelphIa 7, Pa.
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WHAT YOU CAN DO
•

•••••••••••••••••••••••••

liThe on!! dear result of the long, intricate, and bitter de-bate on
disarmament was to underline heavily the importan'Ce of pubBic
opinion."
-A. M. Rosenthal, UN correspondent for the N.Y. Times. in
UN WORLD, April 1952

What you do helps make public OpInIOn. Here are some suggestions
for registering opinion so that it counts:
1. Discuss the subject of disarmament with your neighbors and in your
organizations.

2. Summarlze your view points, if not in toto, then partially, and to
the extent agreement can be reached, send them to the President, the
Secretary of state, your Senators and Congressmen.
3. Send a copy to your newspapers in the form of a letter to the editor
or as a release.
4. As events transpire, express yourself in appropriate ways to your
repre'sentatives in Congress and the UN and to the newspapers.
5. There are peace organizations throughout the country; encourage
them in every way you can. The CommIttee for Peaceful Alternatives is one
such or ganization. Your membership and/or contribution will help in its
work. Write to:

COM'MITTEE FOR P'EACEFUL ALTERNATIVES
30 N'O RTH DEA'RBORN

CHI'C AGO 2. ILL.

AdditiOnal copies of this pamphlet are 25c, or 15c each for orders of
12 or more.
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